We analyse the voting pattern in the June 23 rd referendum on the continued participation of the United Kingdom in the European Union and evaluate the reasons for the results. We find that regions where GDP per capita is low, a high proportion of people have low education, a high proportion is over the age of 65 and there is strong net immigration are more likely to be apprehensive of the E.U., consider the enlargement of the E.U. as having gone too far, be suspicious of immigrants and not want them as neighbours and, most importantly, to vote for Brexit. The fear of immigration does not seem to be fully justified in terms of the literature on the labour market effects of immigrants in the UK. Looking at the response of the sterling exchange to poll numbers we find that investors appear to view Brexit as a negative event.
Introduction
The world witnessed economic and political turmoil in the United Kingdom in the summer of 2016. A country known for the strength of its institutions, the tolerance of its population and an outward looking and measured foreign policy, unilaterally decided to withdraw from the European Union (E.U.) in a close-call referendum. The vote to leave on 23 June subsequently created volatility in financial markets, a political crisis and a possible constitutional crisis caused by the unwillingness of Scotland and Northern Ireland to leave the E.U. World financial markets suffered turbulence with the shares of banks hit particularly hard.
1 There were political consequences for both of the main political parties in the UK as well as for other countries where political parties have demanded referendums. The pattern of voting revealed stark differences between regions, countries and generations within the United Kingdom. Scotland voted with a large majority to remain in the E.U. and there was a majority in Northern Ireland as well as in London while a large majority of electoral districts in provincial England voted to leave.
In this paper, we explore the pattern of voting using data on NUTS 2 regions in the United Kingdom in a search for an answer to the question why a majority of voters wanted to leave the E.U. 2 In particular, we will explain the pattern of voting with variables that measure economic activity and demographic factors, as well as social values. We will first explore the election results briefly and then discuss possible reasons for the leave vote before turning to the statistical analysis. We then evaluate the results in the light of the empirical literature on the effect of immigration on employment and wages in the UK. Finally, we analyse the relationship between the sterling exchange rate and Brexit poll numbers to assess the view of the market on the referendum.
1 See "Global markets lose record $3tn since Brexit vote" by Nicole Bullock, Financial Times, 27 June, 2016. https://next.ft.com/content/91dd01b6-3caf-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 2 The NUTS classification system (Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques) is a coherent regional breakdown system administrated by Eurostat. Its purpose is to provide stable regional statistics for the European Community. The stability aspect makes sure that published data refers to the same regional unit over a certain period of time. Nevertheless, national interests sometimes require an amendment in the breakdown of a country in order to capture more variety within the country. The amendments to the annexes follow a regulated transmission, which guarantees that data published under an older NUTS version are compatible with the current classification. This accounts for the difference in the number of regions between versions. The values measures in this paper from the European Values Study (2011) follow the 2010 version of the NUTS system albeit the output indicators are published under the current 2013 version, which has been accounted for (History of NUTS, n.d.).
The election results
In the days before the election the results were judged to be too close to call. While the leave vote had increased in the Financial Times polls in the weeks prior to the vote, it seemed that the remain-side was strengthening in the few days before the referendum. 3 Thus the leave side had 50.6% in the polls taken on 17 June but had weakened to 48.3% on the day before the referendum. The currency markets appeared to expect the remain-side to win since the sterling exchange rate appreciated in the days before the voting. However, the leave side won with 17,410,742 voters, or 51.9% of the total, wanting to leave the E. U. and 16,141,241, or 48.1%, wanting to remain in the E.U. Table 1 has the results by NUTS2 region. Reading, hosts the headquarters of many foreign multinationals. The same applies to Surrey, which has many organisation and company headquarters and a generally a high standard of living.
Reasons for leaving and remaining
We now turn to the possible reasons behind the decision to leave or remain within the E.U.
put forth in the debate that preceded the referendum. The arguments made by the advocates for leaving centred on immigration and national autonomy. Thus, the supremacy of European laws over British laws -as exemplified by the European Court of Justice -was deemed unacceptable. 6 Moreover, another related issue is the inability of the UK to stem the flow of immigrants coming from other E.U. countries. One objective of the leave camp appears to be to maintain access to the single European market in goods, services and capital -hence protect the interests of the City and the manufacturing sectors -while reducing the flow of immigrants coming mostly from Eastern Europe.
The counterargument made by those who wished to remain within the E.U. was that free migration was one part of the four freedoms that define the Single Market set up in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The 27 remaining countries within the E.U. would never allow the UK to withdraw from one of the four markets -having access to the common market in goods, services and capital while not being a part of the common labour market. In addition, participation in the Single Market through the European Economic Area would requires the UK to adopt the E.U. rules and legislation that apply to the Single Market without having any say in setting these rules as well as to pay an annual sum to the E.U. Thus, leaving the E.U.
would not bring any rewards while increasing uncertainty about future trading arrangements, which would lower investment, employment and growth.
These arguments can be framed in the context of the literature on the optimal size of countries. As argued by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , there are economies of scale in country size in that expanding the size of a country reduces the fixed cost per inhabitant of providing public goods, laws and regulations, operating government institutions and, in the absence of trade with other countries, having access to a larger market. The cost of expanding the size of a country, in contrasts, consists of increasing the heterogeneity of the population, making it more difficult for the government to provide the type of goods and services that each ethnic or cultural group demands. But the trade-off is altered by membership in the European Union because free trade reduces the benefits of size by making it possible for a small country to enjoy access to a larger market than its own and enjoy economic integration without political integration. 8 Gancia et al. (2016) Alesina et al. (2000) argue that under free trade and global markets even small cultural or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small, more homogeneous, political entities while Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) show that empirically smaller countries are more open to trade.
Values, the economy and the Brexit vote
To explain the geographical dispersion in Table 1 These results also suggest that the correlation between growth in London and other regions of England is quite low. In 2014 there were around 3 million people living in the UK who were citizens of another E.U. country, which was about 5% of the UK population at the time, of which 2 million are in work, which is about 7% of the working population.
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Nevertheless, the employment rate of UK-born citizens was at a record high, and the participation rate has not declined, which does not, prima facie, suggest that UK-born individuals were suffering in terms of employment levels as a result of migration.
Thirdly, there is also the possibility that the districts differ in terms of the age profile of the population. We include the proportion of 65 year olds and older of the total population Fourthly, we include the proportion of the population who have not completed secondary school. This group may feel more threatened by increased immigration of less-skilled workers coming from the other member states, especially from Eastern Europe, and hence want the UK to "take control" of the number of immigrants arriving in the country. We discuss the empirical evidence in a later section, which does suggest that the low education workers have more to fear from immigration. 
Canonical correlations
We will split our variables into two groups. There is a group of variables, summarised by a latent variable E that stands for the economy, which are exogenous to voters' decision in the referendum, state variables that cannot be changed by them. These are GDP per capita in each district, the rate of unemployment, the share of the population with low levels of education, the share over 65 years of age, and the rate of net immigration. 14 These variables may then 11 See http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/10/economist-explains-24 and https://next.ft.com/content/1ce1a720-ce94-3c32-a689-8d2356388a1f. 12 See Coleman (1990) , Putnam (2000) , Knack and Keefer (1997) , and Arnorsson and Zoega (2016) . 13 The survey is the European Values Study in 2008 and 2009. It is chosen because it is the only survey on values known to the authors that publishes results using the NUTS classification system. 14 Unemployment is the rate of unemployment in 2015 for workers aged 15 and over; GDP per capita is measured at current market prices in thousands of euros; education is the percentage of inhabitants, between 25 possibly affect the attitudes of voters, including their voting behaviour. Our values variables fall into several groups, summarised by the latent variable V.
Turning first to values, we summarize the information in V by calculating principal components (PC) as shown in Table 2 . The first set of variables measure how many are "very afraid" of the E.U. because they will lose social security; lose national identity and culture;
end up paying more and more to the E.U.; fear that Britain will lose power in the world; and lose jobs in Britain. The first PC of a matrix of 36 observations (districts) and these five values variables explains 82% of the variation in the matrix. The eigenvector corresponding to the first PC has similar values for all five variables. It follows that people who fear the influence of the E.U. express this fear in all five dimensions. We will include the first PC in the subsequent testing of voting behaviour and label it Fear of E.U.
The second group of variables measuring respondents' dislike of having various minority groups as neighbours: These are people of a different race; right-wing extremists; Muslims;
immigrants/foreign workers; and homosexuals. The first PC explains 43% of the variation in the matrix and the corresponding eigenvector has positive weights for all groups apart from right-wing extremists. Thus people who dislike the other four groups tend not to dislike the right-wing extremists. We label this PC Dislike of neighbour.
The third group of variables measures the extent to which respondents fear the effect of immigrants on society: That immigrants take jobs away from natives; that a country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants; that immigrants make crime problems worse; that immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system; that in the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society; and that it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions. The first PC explains 69% of the variation in the data and the values in the eigenvector are similar for all six variables. We call this PC Dislike of immigrants.
In addition to the Fear of E.U., Dislike of immigrant and Dislike of neighbour variables
we add the share of respondents who agree that E.U. enlargement has already gone too far, labelled E.U. enlargement and the share who think that the UK should not receive any more immigrants from less developed countries or No more immigrants. We also use the share of voters who wanted the UK to leave the European Union.
and 64 years of age, with less than primary and lower secondary education in 2015; the share of the elderly is measured as the share of the total population 65 years old or older; immigration is measured as net migration as a share of the population in each district. The table has information on the first five principal components for each of three matrices: the matrix of attitudes towards the E.U., the matrix of attitudes towards having a neighbour belonging to each of five minority groups, and views on the effect of immigrant on society. Each of the matrices has numbers for each of the 36 NUTS2 districts in the UK and each of the five attitude variables generating three 36*5 matrices.
We use canonical correlation analysis, a method proposed by Harold Hotelling in 1936.
The observed variables are separated into two groups and the weights chosen so as to maximise the correlation between the two latent variables E and V, each latent variable summarising the information contained in one group of variables. In our context, we take unemployment, GDP per capita, the share of the population with low education, the share of the older workers and net immigration and summarise these in the latent variable E and relate 
= ( * ) = 1 ∀ where i represents the number of canonical functions. This is vital in order to obtain unique values for the coefficients. 16 In addition, the Squared structure coefficient measures the proportion of variance an observed variable linearly shares with a latent variable and the Communality coefficient gives the proportion of variance in each variable that is explained by all the canonical functions that are interpreted. It informs the researcher about the usefulness of the observed variable for the whole model. Looking at the first canonical function in Table 3 , which is the only one that is statistically significant with F=1.5, shows that low levels of education, a high proportion of people over 65, low GDP per capita and high rates of immigration may create a social climate that fosters fears about the European Union, dislike of neighbours other than right-wing extremists, a negative attitude towards immigrants and a belief that the enlargement of the E.U. has already gone too far in addition to a willingness to prohibit people coming from less developed countries coming into the UK. Most importantly, these feelings go together with voting for leaving the E.U. in the referendum. There is still an upward-sloping relationship in the lower figure but Scotland, Northern
Ireland, West Wales and Merseyside are outliers in having a lower leave vote than their relatively high value of E would lead us to expect.
We can estimate this relationship -that is between the leave vote and the latent variable E -and include dummy variables for the two London districts, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The estimated equation, shown in the first column of Table 4 below, explains 81% of the variation in the data. The estimated equation has a very significant coefficient for E and negative and significant coefficients for London, Northern Ireland and Scotland. 18 We show the relationship between the predicted vote and the actual vote in Figure 2 . Note that in the top right-hand corner the observations furthest under the 45% line are for Wales and
Merseyside -more for remain that the value of E would lead us to predict -while the observations furthest away on the other side -more for leave than the value of E would predict -are from Lincolnshire and Yorkshire. We now turn to estimating equations for the leave vote where all other variables in Table   3 are explanatory variables instead of the latent economic variable E from the canonical correlation analysis. The results are reported in the second column of 21 The results are shown in column (4) and are similar to those in column (3). Using the estimation (3) in Table 4 , an increase in GDP per capita of 5000 euros -such as between the West Midlands and Surrey and Sussex -will lower the share of the leave vote by 0.55%; an increase in the share of the population by 5% over age 65 -such as between West
Yorkshire and Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire -will increase the leave vote by 3.3%; and an increase in the share of the population with low education by 5% -such as between Inner London and Dorset -will increase the leave vote by 4.8%.The coefficient of the migration variable is less significant (insignificant at the 10% level) but an increase in the rate of immigration by 2% is would raise the leave vote by 1.55%. Thus, the leave vote is more sensitive to changes in the share of the less educated and the share of the old.
The vote for leaving was lowest in Inner London (28.09%) and highest in Lincolnshire (65.16%). We use the equation in column (2) of Table 4 to explain the difference in Table 5 below. The difference in the leave vote is 37.07% with Lincolnshire voting heavily to leave and Inner London to stay. This can be explained by GDP per capita being much higher in London, which leads us to predict that the leave vote would be 10.2% lower there; the share of the population with less education being lower in London, which gives a 10.5% lower leave vote in London; and the share of the over 65 years of age being lower in London, which gives a 9.1% lower leave vote. In contrast, differences in the level of migration do not play a big role.
The residual is 6.3%, which is the unexplained leave vote in Lincolnshire.
The difference between the economic fortunes of London and the rest of the country is highlighted in Figure 3 , which plots the average annual growth of GDP per capita from 2000
to 2014 against the level of GDP per capita in 2000. Inner London starts out having three times the average level of GDP per capita in 2000 but grows faster than any other region in the subsequent 14 years. 22 The figure shows that there is a split in the UK between London and the rest of the country and we have shown that this affects the voting pattern. Thus one possible conclusion to be drawn from our results is that globalisation has benefitted the economy of London more than the rest of the UK and that the Brexit vote is a protest by the rest of the country against free trade and free immigration. 22 However, the average growth rate from 2000 to 2014 does not explain the voting pattern, the correlation between the growth rate and the share of voters who wanted to leave is only -0.16. Also, adding the average growth rate to the regressions reported in Table 4 yields an estimated coefficient that is statistically insignificant from zero. 23 Crafts (2005) explored regional convergence and divergence in the UK since 1861. He found that the inequality of regional GDP per capita increased in the second half of the 19th century until WWI, then declined until around 1970 and subsequently increased to end the century at a similar level as at the beginning of it. The increased inequality at the end of both centuries was driven by globalisation, which reduced the price of agricultural products and arable land in the 19th century, while the cities grew rapidly, and reduced manufacturing in late 20th century when the service economy of London and the South East blossomed. He concludes that both episodes of globalization were associated with major changes in regional income differentials with both losers and big winners.
Economic interests and the pattern of voting
It is easy to dismiss the leave vote as based on irrational fear of free trade and the free mobility of workers. The currency market seems to view Brexit as a bad event in that it caused capital outflows, not inflows. Data on the contribution of immigrants to the UK economy also suggest that voters made a mistake. In a recent paper, There is a broad consensus in the literature on UK immigration that the share of immigrants in the labour force has had at most a very small effect on average native wages and employment. 24 In an early paper on the effect of the influx of workers coming from Eastern Europe, Gilpin et al. (2006) fail to find any effect on unemployment. Lemos and Portes (2008) find only a limited effect of the free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK labour market, both wages and unemployment. Wadsworth (2010) reviews the literature on the evidence on the effects of immigration on the UK labour market and finds that immigration has not had a notable effect on employment or wages although there are some indications of downward pressure on wages in the low-skill sector. These downward effects are not large. Reed and Latorre (2009) use LFS data on hourly wages from 2001 to 2007 and subdivide the labour market along occupational and regional lines. They find that a 1% increase in the share of migrants in the UK working-age population (like from 9% to 10%) would reduce wages by around 0.3%. This effect is only significant at the 10% level. Dustman et al. (2005) found very weak effect on the employment outcomes of native workers in the UK. Interestingly, they found a positive relationship between changes in the share of immigrants and changes in wages for a slightly earlier period although this effect is statistically poorly determined. In a recent government report, Devlin et al. (2014) find that immigration has had very little effect on the employment of the UK work force. In particular, they find that the employment rates among E.E.A. (European Economic Area) immigrants exceed those of the native population and that the inactivity rates among these immigrants have been falling for twenty years. The E.E.A. migrants also have lower unemployment rates than native UK workers. Manacorda et al. (2012) provide one explanation for the limited effect of immigrants on the wages of native workers. They show using a pooled time series of British cross-sectional micro data on male wages and employment from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, so that an increase in immigration reduces the wages of immigrants relative to natives.
There is some evidence that the lowest skilled workers in the UK may be adversely affected by immigration. found that each 1% increase in the share of migrants in the UK-born working-age population caused a 0.6% fall in wages of the 5% lowest paid workers and an increase in the wages of higher paid workers. Nickell and Salaheen (2008) found that a 1% increase in the share of migrants in the unskilled and semiskilled service sector reduced average wages in that occupation by 0.5%. In a recent paper, Nickell and Saleheen (2015) explore the effect of immigration on average wages (not native wages) while considering different occupational groups at the regional level instead of skill levels. They measure wages by the average hourly wage of full-time employees. The findings suggest that an increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio has a small negative effect on average British wages. Moreover, the results reveal that the effect of immigration on wages is greatest within the semi-skilled and unskilled service occupational group where a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of immigrants working in the semi/unskilled service sector leads to a 1.8 percent reduction in pay. However, Nickell and Salaheen note that part of this decrease can be due to a compositional effect since immigrants tend to earn less than natives and estimate this compositional effect to account for a 0.54% fall in wages. Finally, these authors find that there is no difference between the effect of E.U. and non-E.U.
immigrants on native wages in the UK.
We have found that the leave vote is concentrated in provincial England and is positively correlated with the share of the less educated and the over 65 years of age group and negatively correlated with the GDP per capita. But in our regressions the rate of immigration did not come out strongly. We have seen that the literature on the labour market effect of immigration suggests a weak, possibly non-existent, effect on average wages and slightly stronger but still a weak effect on the wages of unskilled service-sector workers. Moreover, the data show that the remain-vote was strong in London and the South East where immigrants are a large share of the labour force. 25 So how do we fit the poll results with the empirical evidence on the effect of immigration if the regions that voted most strongly for leaving are neither the regions where the share of immigrants in the labour force is high nor the regions having large flows of immigration from the E.U.? A likely answer is that voters perceive the numbers and effects of immigrants as being much greater than they actually are.
In a Mori poll published a couple of weeks before the referendum on 9 June 2016 responders thought on average that E.U. citizens made up 15% of the total UK population (around 10.5 million people) when in reality it is 5% (3.5 million people). 26 Moreover, people also underestimated the volume of foreign direct investment by other E.U. countries in the UK; they overestimated the net financial contribution the UK makes to the E.U. budget (half of that of Germany, and less than the contributions of France, Italy and Spain).
An exaggerated fear of immigration in public debate may have caused voters to want to leave the E.U., driven by anxiety about their economic security. 27 One can also argue that voting to leave may be justified by immigration having a small negative effect on the lowest wages. Clearly, the act of voting costs a voter only a few minutes of his time but may prevent his wages from falling slightly due to future immigration. This may be a rational thing to do from a pure self-interest in spite of the indications of a weak effect of immigration on native wages.
25 See Reed and Latorre (2009 
Brexit and Sterling
We turn to the currency markets to analyse whether the currency traders anticipated the Brexit vote, whether they thought it was good for the currency, and what was the effect of changes in the poll numbers from one poll to another on the sterling exchange rate if not fully anticipated. The UK's departure from the E.U. could affect the fundamentals of the sterling exchange rate. For example, the UK may no longer be a good place for foreign direct investment in production facilities aimed at the E.U. market and the price of credit default swaps for UK banks may increase. Conversely, if the markets expect post-Brexit UK to flourish outside the E.U., forming trade relationships with countries outside the E.U. and passing laws and regulations that make the business sector more flexible and dynamic, then sterling might actually appreciate.
We start in Figure 4 by showing the movement of the sterling-euro exchange rate since It then fell in value after the referendum bill was unveiled. The announcement that Tory ministers would be allowed to campaign for the leave side was followed by the depreciation of sterling and the same occurred after the draft renegotiation.
Throughout this period there is no clear effect in either direction from news that should have made Brexit more or less likely. However, in the days before the referendum on 23 June the movements of sterling appear to reflect changes in the probable outcome of the referendum.
Thus polls that gave the leave campaign a majority were followed by a large depreciation of the currency and the tragic murder of an MP only a week before the referendum, which may have convinced some that the remain side would come out on top, was followed by an appreciation. Finally, the referendum outcome caused a sudden depreciation. Table A2 in the appendix documents some of the news events that may be expected to have impacted the sterling exchange rate. Visual inspection suggests that the political events in the two to three years prior to the referendum had a modest impact on the sterling exchange rate. However, there is some indication that events in the days before had an effect and certainly the referendum outcome did make sterling depreciate. The first equation shows that the change in the poll numbers depends on the lagged exchange rate. Thus, the higher the value of sterling on the day before the poll is taken, the smaller is the increase in the proportion wanting to leave the E.U. There is also some mean reversion in the poll numbers, so that following an increase in the leave vote it falls back by about 10% for every poll conducted. The second equation shows that an increase in the share of voters wanting to leave coincides with a depreciation of sterling. The same applies to a large share of voters wanting to leave. Moreover, the lower the level of the exchange rate the bigger the increase in the leave vote. 1.12.13 1.1.14 1.2.14 1.3.14 1.4.14 1.5.14 1.6.14 1.7.14 1.8.14 1.9.14 1.10.14 1.11.14 1.12.14 1. Figure 4 . The Sterling-euro exchange rate
The fact that an increase in the leave vote makes sterling depreciate suggests that the currency market does not anticipate the poll numbers fully. Note that the explanatory power of both equations is very weak: Sterling movements explain only 5% of the variation of the poll numbers and the changes in the poll results explain only 1% of the sterling movements.
Finally, the numerical values of the estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the proportion of respondents who want the UK to leave the European Union leads to a 1% decline in the exchange rate. This is a very strong long-term effect on sterling. Since about 50% of voters wanted to leave the E.U. according to poll numbers the days before the referendum, the effect of the result of the referendum could be calculated by setting the leave side at 100%. This would make sterling depreciate by about 50% in steady state. In contrast, the short term effect would be small.
Concluding remarks
The pattern of voting in the referendum reflects differences in the age composition of the population and the share of the less educated, with the older generation and the less educated 
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The reasons why Scotland voted solidly to remain are less obvious. One possible reason is that its leaders see E.U. membership as important for their future as an independent state.
With only 5.3 million in 2016, they may want to outsource some of the functions of the state.
There are clearly fixed costs in being an independent state and these fixed costs may make full independence impossible unless they can outsource some of the tasks of the state. But why not use the United Kingdom to outsource some of the functions to England? One possible reason is that the Scotland may find England more intrusive in their internal affairs than the European Union. Alesina et al. (2000) show how openness and economic integration allow small cultural or ethnic groups to form small, homogeneous political jurisdictions while enjoying the economic benefits of access to a large market.
So what can we conclude from these results? While the benefits of free trade and the mobility of labour can be shown using economic theory, it is clear both from theory and the data that not everyone gains equally. There are winners and losers. And if the losers are sufficiently many, they may vote for nationalist political parties or against free trade and the free mobility of workers in a referendum. One interpretation would be that what happened in the UK is also happening in many other western countries where nationalist sentiments are on the rise. Sufficiently many people are disappointed that their living standards have not improved in recent years and decades and blame it on foreigners, either because of imports from low-cost countries or migrants coming from these countries. But nationalist sentiments may not provide the answers or solutions these people are looking for. Instead, economists and politicians should focus more on making capitalism inclusive so that a large majority of voters feel that they are part of it, benefiting from it and voting for politicians and policies that emphasize free trade and free migration within the E.U.
28 See Bolton et al. (1996) on the role of factor mobility in determining the incentives towards separation or integration. 
25-26 June 2015 -European Council meeting
The first EU summit after David Cameron's unexpected victory in the UK general election. The summit ended up being dominated by the migrant crisis and Greek debt crisis. Cameron used the meeting -otherwise dominated by the Greek debt crisis and European migrant crisis -to formally set out his aims. Speaking after it, he said he was delighted the process of "reform and renegotiation" of the UK's membership of the EU was "properly under way". 
